In an electronic auction protocol, the main participants are the seller, a set of trusted auctioneer(s) and the set of bidders. In this paper we consider the situation where there is a seller and a set of n bidders intending to come to an agreement on the selling price of a certain good. Full private or bidder-resolved auction means that this agreement is reached without the help of trusted parties or auctioneers. Therefore, only the seller and the set of bidders are involved, the role of the auctioneers becomes obsolete in this case. We propose a new -simple and securetechnique for the design of a full private sealed-bid auction protocol. We employ the well known mathematical proposition, the knapsack problem which was used by Merkle and Hellman [1] in the design of their asymmetric public-key knapsack trapdoor cryptosystem. Up to our knowledge, the knapsack problem has not been considered before in the design of electronic auctions. We also employ an efficient (1-out-of-k) oblivious transfer of strings for secure data transfer between the seller and the bidders (e.g., [2] ). At the end of the protocol, the seller knows the set of prices selected by the bidders, yet he doesn't know which bid belongs to which bidder until the winning bidder announces himself and proves his case by opening a secret code corresponding to the highest price. Our protocol is a 1 st price and automatically a 2 nd price auction as well, since the winning bidder can pay the 2 nd highest priceindicated by a flag -according to the public auction predefined rules. We give the protocol for honest but curious participants then we show how to detect malicious behavior of the participants by employing a one way function with a suitable homomorphic property.
INTRODUCTION
Auctions become a major phenomenon in the field of electronic commerce. In an electronic auction, there is a seller that wants to sell a good; he defines a set of prices (several hundred tokens) for his good. There is a set of bidders who are willing to bid for this good; each bidder makes his selection for the price. At the end of the protocol, the bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the highest price or sometimes the second highest price according to the auction public rule of payment. Some properties must be satisfied by any auction protocol. Fast execution: this is a common desired property in any computer network protocol. Economic design: the auction must be designed on solid economic principles, the bidders have to bid as they truly value the item based on their own valuation or indifference price. Privacy: no information is revealed about any bidder's bid during or after the auction is completed, only the winning bidder and the corresponding selling price is known at the end of the protocol. Anonymity: no information is revealed about any bidder's identity, the protocol is completely anonymous until the winning bidder announces himself to the public or to the seller with a proof that he is the intended winner, and no information about the identity of the other bidders is revealed. At the end of our protocol, the seller knows the set of prices selected by the bidders yet he doesn't know which price belongs to which bidder. Since no information is revealed about the identity of any bidder or his corresponding bid, privacy and anonymity are attained. Auctions can be classified into three main categories, these are: increasing price (English auction), decreasing price (Dutch auction) and sealed-bid auction. In an English auction, the good is offered at increasing prices. Initially, the good is offered at T tokens, in time slot i, it is offered at (  i T  ) tokens where  is a function of several factors such as the previous bids. This type of auction has several disadvantages, the time required to conduct the auction is proportional to the price at which the item is sold, and the communication costs may grow super linearly in the ultimate price at which the item is sold. This type of auction leaks enormous amount of information, an observer can deduce information about the price that each party is willing to pay for this good and hence; true valuation, privacy and anonymity are lost. Dutch auction is similar to the English auction except the way the price varies over time. In this case, the price decreases, that is, at time slot i, the good is offered at ) (
tokens. The first bidder who is willing to bid wins the auction. Hence, this type of auction provides maximum privacy and anonymity. However, as in the case of English auction, it is time consuming. In a sealed-bid auction, each party sends a sealed bid to a trusted auctioneer who opens all bids; the auctioneer sells the good to the bidder of the highest bid. The sealed-bid auction is very attractive, since, it can execute in one round of communication between the bidders and the auctioneers and hence it is very fast. However, the trusted auctioneers are its main disadvantage. Our protocol is a sealed-bid auction without the help of any auctioneers, that is, only the seller and the set of bidders are able to come to an agreement on the selling price. This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we give a brief description of the related work in the field and the contributions of this paper. In section 3, we give a bird's eye view on our protocol. Section 4 presents the basic tools used in the protocol. Section 5 presents a concrete description of the protocol in the case of honest but curious participants to clarify the basic steps; also, we include a simple numerical illustrative example. Section 6 presents the full protocol to detect any malicious behavior attempted by the participants.
RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Franklin and Reiter [3] introduced the basic problem of sealed-bid auction but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished. Many secure auction protocols have been proposed, some of which are not suitable for the execution of a 2 nd price auction [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 35] . Another category of the work in this field is based on threshold cryptography and relies on the existence of a set of auctioneers where at most one third of them are not trusted [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . Some of the proposed protocols rely on the existence of a third party that is not fully trusted. In [16, 17] the third party may not collude with any bidder, while in [18, 19] the third party and the auctioneers may collude. In [20, 21] there is a trusted third party that holds the key for a public-encryption algorithm. The recent work of Felix Brandt [22, 23, 24, 25] introduces a novel kind of secure and private auction where information is shared among bidders and only the seller and the set of bidders are incorporated in the protocol. In this paper we propose a protocol for electronic sealed-bid auction which is very simple with much lower complexity and satisfies full privacy and security. The protocol proposed in this paper satisfies the following properties:
 Full privacy or bidder-resolved: There are no trusted parties or auctioneers involved in the protocol, only the seller and the set of bidders are involved and are able to come to an agreement on the selling price.  Private-bids: No information is revealed about any bidder's bid, at the end of the protocol the seller knows the set of prices chosen but he does not know which bid belongs to which bidder.  Anonymity: No information is revealed about the identity of any of the bidders until the winning bidder of the highest bid identifies himself to the seller and he is able to prove his case by opening his secret code corresponding to the highest bid.  Fast execution: Our protocol is a sealed-bid auction protocol; therefore, the protocol is fast compared to other protocols that depend on time slotted tokens such as English and Dutch auctions. Also, the novel attempt of employing the knapsack mathematical proposition speeds up the execution of the protocol over previous sealed-bid auction protocols.  Correctness: the winning bidder and the selling price are determined correctly.  Applicability: Our protocol applies to the 1 st price and 2 nd price auction as well.
THE OUTLINES OF OUR PROTOCOL
There is a seller that wants to sell a good; he selects a set P of k prices (tokens) for this good where, P } ,..., c . There is also a k-bit vector F } ,...,
There is a set B of n bidders, B = } ,..., After each bidder possesses the secret code corresponding to his chosen price, the bidders -jointly and securelycompute the sum of the secret codes they have and delivers the result to the seller, we must satisfy that no bidder knows any information about any other bidder's bid (secret code). Also, the seller must not know which bid belongs to which bidder. This can be achieved through a trivial additive joint secret sharing scheme. Simply, each bidder splits his secret code into n additive shares and privately sends a share to each other bidder. Each bidder then sums what he has and the result is delivered to the seller. The seller, by his role, sums what he receives from the bidders to compute the knapsack value and starts to solve the knapsack problem for the value he receives from the bidders to determine the set of flags, F. As a result of the solution of the knapsack problem, the flag i f is set to one if and only if the corresponding price i p was selected by one of the bidders, the seller is able to know the set P` P of the selected prices, yet, he still does not know which bidder selected which price. The seller then publishes the winning price (bid). The bidder of the highest price announces himself or identifies himself to the seller and proves his case by opening the secret code corresponding to the highest price in the set P`.
OVERVIEW OF THE BASIC TOOLS
In this section we introduce a brief overview of the underlying primitives used in our auction protocol. Rabin [26] proposed the concept of oblivious transfer (OT) in the cryptographic scenario. In this case The sender (seller) has only one secret bit m and would like to have the receiver (buyer) to get it with probability 1/2, on the other hand, the receiver does not want the sender to know whether it gets m or not. For 1 2 OT , the sender has two secrets 1 m and 2 m , the receiver will get one of them at the receiver's choice. The receiver does not want the sender to know which bit he chooses and the receiver must not know any information other than what he has chosen. OT to the case of k secrets. However, constructing
Oblivious transfer
OT is not a trivial problem.
1 k OT is also known as "All or nothing disclosure of secrets (ANDOS)" [27, 28, 29, 30] . Oblivious transfers is a fundamental primitive in many cryptographic applications and secure distributed computations and has many applications such as private information retrieval (PIR), fair electronic contract signing, oblivious secure computation, etc. [31, 32] . In our auction protocol we will employ an efficient 
The Knapsack problem
The knapsack problem is a mathematically attractive proposition for cryptography. Merkle and Hellman public-key asymmetric cryptosystem [1] was based on the trapdoor knapsack problem. Assume a key ) ,..., 
. Then the knapsack cryptosystem encrypts the plaintext X according to the formula:
. The calculation of Y from X and K is simple, while the recovery of X from Y and K involves solving a knapsack problem and is generally difficult when K is randomly chosen. If the key K is chosen at random but also is chosen such that each element of K is larger than the sum of the preceding elements, the corresponding knapsack problem becomes very simple. That is, if The process continues until the whole X is recovered. Our auction protocol will rely mainly on the knapsack problem. 
Proof of equality of discrete logarithms

OUR KNAPSACK AUCTION PROTOCOL FOR HONEST PARTICIPANTS
In this section we give a concrete description of the proposed auction protocol when the participants (the seller and the bidders) incorporated in the protocol are honest but curious. The term 'honest' means that all the participants execute the steps of the protocol correctly and honestly. The term 'curious" means that the participants are willing to view any secret information leaked during the execution of the protocol but they do not deviate from the correct execution. This is equivalent to the eavesdropping adversary model. An eavesdropping adversary watches and learns all the information transferred to and from the corrupted participant but does not prevent him from contributing in the protocol correctly. In the described protocol, we will assume that each bidder makes a bid different from any other bidder, that is, all bids are distinct. Soon, and after describing the tie-free auction protocol, we will show how to detect a tie between two or more bidders. The tie-free auction protocol is given in the following subsection. 
The detailed description of the protocol
Announcing the winning bidder:
 The seller broadcasts the highest price indicated by the vector F which contains the flags corresponding to the prices P` chosen by the bidders.  The seller requests the winning bidder (holding the secret code corresponding to the highest price) to identify himself.  The winning bidder proves his case to the seller by showing the secret code he holds.
Although we described the protocol as a 1 st price auction, one may notice that the protocol is automatically a 2 nd price auction since the winning bidder can pay the 2 nd highest price indicated by the flags vector, F.
Simple numerical illustrative example
We will give a simple example at a medium level of details to illustrate the basic operations and computations. We will not describe the lower level details. The parameters are chosen strictly for simplicity of the example. 
OUR KNAPSACK AUCTION PROTOCOL FOR MALICIOUS PARTICIPANTS
Since the participants of the auction protocol are malicious, the first thing that comes to mind is that each participant must be committed to the values he selects, possesses or computes during the execution of the auction protocol in order to detect any attempt to manipulate or tamper with these values. As in most multiparty computation protocols a one way function with a suitable homomorphic property is required. Feldman in [33] used a one way function based on the discrete log problem. The main objective of Feldman was to add verifiability property to the well know Shamir's secret sharing scheme [34] . Let p and q be two large prime numbers such that 
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AN OPEN PROBLEM
As a way to improve privacy to the maximum, it would be nice if it is possible to let the seller solves the knapsack problem only for the highest price in the case of a 1 st price auction or for the 1 st and 2 nd highest prices in the case of a 2 nd price auction and hides all the rest of the bids from the seller and at the same time enables the detection of a lying seller. Our protocol hides the correspondence of the bids, since the seller is not able to know which bid belongs to which bidder.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced a novel technique for electronic sealed-bid auction by employing the well known mathematical proposition, the knapsack problem to enable the seller to solve for the bids made by the bidders without having any information about which bid belongs to which bidder, therefore, the protocol is private and anonymous, the identity and the corresponding bids of the bidders -except the winning bidder -are kept unknown. The protocol is simple and of efficient execution time and data transfer complexity over previous protocols. The protocol does not involve any trusted parties or auctioneers. Only the seller and the set of bidders are able to come to an agreement on the selling price. We have shown the complete description of the protocol in the case of honest but curious participants, also, we have shown the protocol to detect malicious behavior of the participants. Our protocol is a 1 st price and a 2 nd price auction since the winning bidder can simply pay the 2 nd highest price indicated by the corresponding flag. We have shown also how a tie can be detected by the bidders.
